Originally published on Small Wars Journal, February 2010.
"To defeat a network, you have to be a network"
General Stanley A. McChrystal
Commander, International Security Assistance Force and
Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan
In counterinsurgencies, the most difficult
thing to understand is the nature of the conflict.
The military is very self-referential with the outside
world. Soldiers tend to see the world through a military lens. When a soldier sees hills, he thinks key
terrain: an area the seizure or retention of which
affords a marked advantage to either combatant.
When an agronomist sees hills, he sees the principal water catchment area and the need for elevated
irrigation canals. A decentralized civilian-military
network reveals a complete picture of the “whole
world” which leads to better decision making. Having decentralized networks within a structured hierarchy such as the military brings a certain amount of chaos and ambiguity in exchange for innovation.
5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, also
known as Task Force Stryker, has sought to develop in its key leaders and staff the ability to see the
“whole world.” This was accomplished through
multiple Human Dimension leadership development programs away from Fort Lewis, which is
where the unit was based. Implicit in this approach
was the intent to get away from the military world
and put them in a different environment. Many of
the programs were not about war at all; they were
about humans enduring through challenging situations.
This was surprising to some because Stryker
brigades have been called “the most lethal and
agile formation on any battlefield anywhere.”
114
Lethality and agility are necessary but not sufficient to winning a counterinsurgency. A sufficient
characteristic is having decentralized networks.
General Martin Dempsey, Commander, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, spoke about
“networked decentralized organizations, and how
hierarchical organizations have a very difficult time encountering them” and how the Army is moving towards an organization that is “more trust than control,”
115
Task Force Stryker (TFS) is one of the most
technologically networked brigades in the United
States Army. It is the first brigade to deploy with
land warrior, "a modular fighting system that uses
state-of-the-art computer, communications, and
global positioning technologies to digitally link soldiers on the battlefield. The system is integrated
with the Soldier's body armor and has a helmet-mounted display.”
116
TFS soldiers even have the unprecedented
ability to be linked directly with fighter pilots.
Beyond the flashing icons and flickering screens
resides an unseen decentralized network: the fusion cells.
There are six fusion cells within TFS: Tactical, Population and Resource Control, Advisory,
Intelligence, Special Operation Forces, and Governance, Reconstruction, and Development (GR&D).
Each fusion cell is a working group where various
staff members come together to address issues
specific to that cell. Fusion cells are decentralized
networks, Issues are not given to traditional staff
elements, but managed by a problem-oriented
team. It is a highly effective way to flatten the staff
and achieve a multidisciplinary cross-pollination of
ideas and holistic solutions. There was a reason
why Major Michael Gephart was chosen to be in
charge of all the fusion cells. He used to work in the
Special Forces (SF) community, which are the very
definition of decentralized networks. SF usually
works in twelve-man Operational Detachments
Alpha (ODAs) which can be deployed anywhere to
do anything. That is why he personally brought two capacities central to decentralized organizations to the fusion cells: anyone can do anything and
anyone can be invited to fusion cell meetings.
TFS’s
Long Range Strategy emphasizes excellence in planning. To this end, TFS
established a GR&D fusion cell with the objective of collaborating with similar organizations already in existence in Kandahar Province, specifically the Kandahar Provincial
Reconstruction Team. The Brigade Commander’s vision stated that "Once the capability of Governance, Reconstruction, and
Development Fusion Cell is understood others will seek to work with it.”
These words have been prophetic because
recently a United States Department of Agriculture
representative switched over from another organization just to work alongside TFS. Furthermore,
there are many other civilians at the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul who are starting to hear about TFS and
have contacted the GR&D fusion cell to collaborate
on future projects. In the business world, they
would probably call this branding. Branding leads
to increased perceived value and builds trust. TFS
is a centralized company that decentralizes the customer experience. Its customers range from the
American Public, to International Actors, and to
the Afghan people. Every customer not only receives products and services but the help shape the
formation and delivery of these products and services. For instance, before TFS executes any major
project, there will be deliberations with the Provincial Reconstruction Team, the USG regional plat-
form, Afghan Provincial and District Leaders, as
well as Tribal Leaders. Having so many moving
pieces for one activity highlights the lack of visibility for the tactical commanders, which requires an
unprecedented level of trust which is necessary in small wars.
Building the Trust for the Revolution
Building a hybrid model with the coexis-
tence of the structure and control of the military as
well as the chaos and ambiguity of a decentralized
network requires trust. This required a two-prong
approach: building the capacity of the network to
accept chaos as well as empowering people. The
Commander of TFS, Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV,
made it work because he empowered people and
got out of the way and then championed the ability of junior officers to express their views in a hierarchical system."
117 This was challenging to say the least because the military perceives decentralized networks not only as ineffective, but dangerous.
118
Seven months before deployment, he sent a
young company grade officer throughout the greater Seattle region to build networks. While attending a six-month course called “Creating a Company” at the University of Washington, the young
officer was introduced to the Keiretsu Forum and
the Northwest Entrepreneur Network. The Keiretsu Forum is the world’s largest angel investor net-
work with 750 accredited investor members
throughout eighteen chapters on three continents.
The Northwest Entrepreneur Network is a 700
member strong organization that is dedicated to
helping the entrepreneurship community in the Northwest.
The course led by Dr. John Castle, was the
only one of its kind in the world where students
teamed up to form companies with start-up funding from the Michael G. Foster School of Business.
TF’s young officer started up a company with two
other students called Pristine Polishing, which
provides eco-friendly yacht detailing. Indirectly, he
learned how to ensure that contractors would not
be able to gouge him on prices. In Afghanistan,
there is a serious issue of Coalition Forces paying
too much for projects and a lack of oversight. Sending off a young company grade officer into Seattle
for six months required a tremendous amount of trust.
Furthermore, TFS considered mobile phone
banking for the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) with the Chief Executive Officer of a leading provider of mobile information solutions. He
explained how companies have tried this in Kenya
and the Philippines with mixed results. These
companies would basically have nodes, such as
small grocery shops, which can receive text messages from the bank to confirm credit or withdrawal of funds once their customers sent a text message to the bank. However, the fundamental issue
still remained: the nodes needed cash eventually
and these companies existed due to the remoteness
or lack of security of these population centers.
Based on this experience, TFS was able to eliminate that as a potential solution before arrival in
sector and concentrate on establishing security and
telecommunication support for automated teller
machines (ATMs) instead. ANSF were being
wounded or killed on their way to the Kabul Bank
ATM in Kandahar City to draw their wages. They
have to use Kabul Bank because this is where the
Ministry of Interior transfers their wages. There
was only one Kabul Bank ATM in all of Kandahar
Province. The GR&D fusion cell sent a representative to meet with the Chief Operations Officer of
Kabul Bank in order to convince him to open up a
new branch.
This networking was not limited to the business world. Anticipating the need for road experts
in a country with mobility issues, two University of
Washington Engineering professors were contacted: Joe Mahoney (an ex-Air force officer) and
Steve Muench (an ex- Navy officer). They created
Pavement Interactive, an internet-based collaborative space that for all things pavement. This net-
work enables TFS to execute pavement projects in
the absence of road experts. Furthermore, a law
professor named Clark Lombardi led to the intro-
duction of Barnett Rubin, one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan, and his yahoo group comprised of 1,459 experts and other interested persons on Afghanistan.
This decentralized network was tested during TFS’s National Training Center rotation, where brigades train before their deployment, with a re-quest for information on current wages for a day’s worth of unskilled labor in southern Afghanistan.
Within twenty-four hours, the latest data from all
sorts of government officials, U.S. and Afghan, was
obtained. Pre-deployment activities of the GR&D
fusion cell developed the capacity of its members to
operate as a decentralized network. This has paid
dividends once the unit arrived in theatre and
started to expand its networks and relationships
with its civilian partners. The network revolution has begun.
Expanding the Network
The concept of coordinated civilian-military strategy development and planning has been relatively
new yet widely successful in Regional Command South, Afghanistan.
To clarify the alphabet soup that is the civil-
military world, the civil-military cell of the Region-
al Command South will be referred to as the “CIV-MIL cell," the Civil Military Cooperation shop will
be referred to as the “CJ9.” The CJ9 focused on
provincial level partners while the CIVMIL cell focused on regional and national level partners. The
CIVMIL cell stood up in December 2008. The cell’s
mandate is to develop a regional comprehensive
integrated civil-military strategy. Thereafter, The
United States Government (USG) Civilian Platform
was stood up in August 2009. The platform’s
mandate is to achieve USG and ultimately coalition
unity of effort through the pursuit of an integrated
civil-military strategy.
TFS arrived in sector (Kandahar and Zabul Province) in July 2009. Within a month of arriving, the
CIVMIL cell hosted a lessons learned session with
briefings by the Civil-Military Operations shop of
Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan as well
as members of the CIVMIL cell. The Marines have
been operating in neighboring Helmand Province
since June 2009. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Lee of
the Marines, gave an extensive overview of all the
civil-military activities and programs that existed,
from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation’s Nation-
al Solidarity Program to the Independent Directorate of Local Governance’s Afghan Social Outreach
Program, and how best to integrate these into the commander’s intent.
For a whole month, the CIVMIL cell as well
as their next door neighbor, the CJ9 shop introduced all the various civil-military players in the
region. Needless to say, TFS’s network expanded
enormously during this month. At first, the GR&D
fusion cell relied heavily on the only two military
officers in the CIVMIL cell at that time, First Lieutenant Russell Grant and Navy Lieutenant Joshua Welle. Their departure however was not without benefit as it forced the GR&D fusion cell to expand
their networks to the civilian members of the CIV-
MIL cell, with as varied backgrounds as Jason
Lewis-Berry of the State Department, Bernard Haven of Canadian International Development Agency, and Marcus Knuth, of the Danish Embassy in Kabul.
Shortly thereafter, TFS added two civilians
to its ranks: the experienced Todd Greentree of the
Department of State, with Afghanistan being his
fifth duty post in an irregular conflict, following El
Salvador 1980-83, the Bougainville Rebellion, Papua New Guinea 1987-88, the People Power Revolution and Maoist insurgency in Nepal 1990-93,
the death of Jonas Savimbi and the termination of
the Angolan civil war 1999-2002, and Neil Clegg, a
former Canadian Army officer and veteran of 27
years in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade. Mr. Greentree served as
the senior civilian to TFS and Mr. Clegg as the liaison between Canadian Task Force Kandahar to TFS on stabilization and development issues.
During early engagements, Task Force
Stryker considered its embedded civilians as
"enablers" of its military objectives. Soon, there
was a realization that their capabilities went far
beyond “enabling” the unit to achieve its military
objectives. By treating them as full partners in the
full spectrum of the planning process, they showed
on specific occasions a strong ability to be creative
and innovative in the planning process. Their forte
was manifested in their conceptual skills. On the
other hand, the military was adept at structuring
frameworks and turning plans into deliverable
communication, such as fragmentation or operation orders. Also, the military is one of the premier
organizations that can move thousands of personnel and pieces of equipment around. TFS used its
civilians’ decades of experience in a kaleidoscopic
range of fields to build its own capacity and expand its networks.
Practical Applications for Tactical Commanders
Fighting a war in a coalition is a complex
undertaking. However, Regional Command South’s
fifteen contributing nations lengthens the decision
making process. Capitals need to be contacted and
deliberations take time because the ultimate decision makers are often in Kabul, Washington, Ottawa, or London. Two practical applications of utilizing the civil-military network are for drafting strategic overview plans as well as making use of the civilian hierarchy. One of the first things TFS found
itself dealing with was the drafting of the Kandahar
Coordination Plan, “a comprehensive approach to
synchronizing and coordinating the military and
civilian activities of Canada and the U.S. in Kandahar province for one year.”
119
Deliberating the nuances of one word versus
another is not a military forte. However, to ensure
that these strategic level plans maintain their focus, it is important to be precise. This is one area
where civilians have substantial expertise. Mr.
Greentree served with Task Force Warrior in Regional Command East and Mr. Clegg has served as
both a Canadian Army Officer and business development planner. With decades of experience in
their respective diplomatic services as well as first-hand military experience, they played an invaluable role in translating doctrinal military text into plain language.
Strategic overview plans define the joint intent of senior military and civilian leaders. They
serve to maintain a common strategic direction,
while not inhibiting subordinate commanders’ tactical freedom of action. Consistent with the task of
shared civil-military strategic vision, TFS started
District-level planning sessions in October. The
intent was to achieve unity of effort between the
battle-space owners and civilian counterparts at
the district level to achieve a unity of effort and
identify areas where the brigade or higher can support.
Preparing these strategic plans has been an
iterative process. The process of developing the
first District Stabilization Plan (Arghandab) was
fraught with difficulty stemming from inexperience, lack of focus on desired end states, and lack
of adequate preparatory action done by the inputting individual planners. The first planning session
lasted almost six hours and ended when the participants reached a state of fatigue. It was only
through the superb individual efforts of Mr. Lewis-
Berry, the Chief of Staff of the Senior Civilian to
Regional Command South, in providing a coherent
summation of the day’s discussions the process
was able to be continued. The lessons learned from
the first session were the need for: a clear agenda, a
focused participants list, a list of shared or com-
mon objectives, and a clear expectation for preparation and follow up. These were all necessary to
have towards a meaningful and efficient commencement of a consultative strategic planning process.
Feeling the way forward, the second session
in Spin Boldak, which is separated from Kandahar
Airfield by eighty kilometers and not nearly as familiar to the participants, took only four hours and
produced a much more concise, focused, and substantial end product in terms of its identification of
crucial areas of interest and desired one-year and
three-year end states. The lessons learned from
this process were the need for identifying areas
where there were crucial gaps in critical intelligence. These gaps were essential and had to be ad- dressed quickly and substantially.
Having parallel civilian-military hierarchies
can be useful to tactical commanders. For examples, requests for humanitarian assistance pack-
ages through the Combined Information Data
Network Exchange (CIDNE) were consistently held
up at the United States Forces Afghanistan level.
The GR&D fusion cell encountered roadblocks
while going through the military’s chain of command, It was much easier for Mr. Greentree to call
a two-star equivalent civilian who could help influence the situation. The USG Civilian Platform
seems to have a horizontal rather than a vertical
reporting chain. Aside from the practical applications of employing the network for various tasks
that the military is less competent with, civilian
partners play a role in seeing the “whole world” picture which leads to better decision making.
The Value of Different Perspectives
TFS values different perspectives from different agencies, branches and nations because it
leads to better decision making. In October, thirty-
one participants from a diversity of networks were
invited to a District Planning Session in Spin Boldak. The participants hailed from agencies such as
the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Regional Command South CIVMIL cell, Human Terrain Team, United States Agency for International
Aid and Development’s (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives, Spin Boldak’s Border Coordination
Center, Task Force Kandahar, Combined Joint
Interagency Task Force Anzio, Kandahar Intelligence Fusion Cell, United States Department of
Agriculture, Department of State, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment and others.
The planning session focused on one-year
and three-year end states. The unit focused on the
one-year plan, which centered on ANSF-led persistent security for select model villages which led to a
stabilization and then development of those population centers. Mr. Lewis-Berry emphasized the need for the three-year plan. Civilians attached to
the maneuver battalions often tend to align their
views with the battalions or with their own personal expertise (the agriculture expert will usually advocate for agriculture), which is why it was important to bring brigade and regional command level
civilian partners to emphasize the long view.
Having regional command level planners
ensured that the unit’s plan synchronized with the
regional plan. Ultimately, the three-year plan centered on the fact that major regional projects and
programs will result in an increased supply of agricultural products coming from the Helmand and
Arghandab River Valleys that will exceed regional
demand, which will result in the export through
Spin Boldak to Pakistan. These major projects and
programs include but are not limited to USAID’s
$240M Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production of Agriculture Plus (AVIPA Plus) program
(increase in agricultural output), the Dahla Dam
project (increase in irrigation of the Arghandab
River Valley), and the installation of the third generator in Kajaki Dam (increase in electricity). The
regional plan depends on movement along all
phases of the value chain. Spin Boldak will rightfully so be on the storage, processing, and packaging portion of the value chain.
The value chain is an important concept for
the Commander of TFS, because he sees beyond
single, isolated projects. Understanding the value
chain is understanding the whole picture. Agriculture is the defining economic driver of Regional
Command South. It does not solely depend on the
farmer, “there needs to be effective integration between retailers, sales and marketing agents, distributors, transporters, processors, merchants and producers.
120 Therefore, to really improve stability or economic development, the
whole spectrum of the Phased Value Chain Development
value chain needs to be
developed.
The lines between all levels of war have been blurred by the nature of small wars. It takes an adaptable and fast-learning organization to exploit any situation. Aside from Provincial (Brigade) and District (Battalion) level planning, the GR&D
fusion cell has actually facilitated population center level planning
(Company). Combat Outpost Rath, which is
occupied by Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion,
1st Infantry Regiment
(2-1 IN) is located within the center of the largest population center in
Maiwand District.
Eighteen people were present for this planning session to include the Police Mentoring Team Leader from the 4th Brigade, 82nd Infantry Division, the Battalion’s Department of State representative, the Battalion Executive Officer, two
Asymmetric Warfare Group representatives, the
Civil Affairs Team, the Battalion Information Operations Officer, the Battalion Non-lethal Coordinator, the Center for Army Lessons Learned
liaison officer to TFS, the Brigade Economic
Development Officer, the Kandahar Provincial
Reconstruction Team’s Agriculture representative, all the Platoon leaders, the Company Executive Officer, and finally the Company Commander.
This planning session was an example of
the decentralized network being utilized. Various partners usually working at the regional
command or higher level were called upon to
plan at the provincial level one week and the
company level the next. The session concluded
with a lead identified on every project. For example, USAID will concentrate on service and technical contracts, the Civil Affairs Team will concentrate on infrastructure projects, and the Brigade
will focus on getting regional level assets down to the company. Every identified project was targeted at addressing a specific grievance. To identify
grievances, TFS uses the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework, which is a tool to
help understand a part of the world that both the
civil-military side has just recently begun to see.
The next evolution of these planning sessions would be to include district or provincial level officials.
A Vehicle for Understanding the Whole Picture
The Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) is designed as a systematic approach to getting the whole picture which
leads to the identification and mitigation of grievances. Grievances make frustrated people, who
then pick up guns and shoot others. Dr. Jim Derleth of USAID, the creator of TCAPF, always uses
the example that there are a billion people living
under a dollar wage per day, yet they do not all pick
up guns and shoot people. Therefore, the notion of
poverty being tied to an insurgency is misguided.
The opposite of grievances are resiliencies. Resiliencies are governmental and societal capability
and capacity to resist grievances. Conventional military targeting usually ignores the sources of resiliencies which can often help the mission more
than killing a high value target. An example is an
influential school teacher who told all his children
and their parents that improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) hurt their children and their community.
IEDs went down 30% in the next month.
TCAPF has five phases which are Collection,
Analysis, Design, Implementation, and Evaluation.
Collection is done at the squad level with the use of
their standardized questionnaire with four questions. The first question is, “Have there been
changes in the village population in the last year?”
The second question is, “What are the most important problems facing the village?” The third question is “Who do you believe can solve your problems?” The fourth question is, “What should be done to first help the village?” These questions have been
developed over the years from an assortment of surveys and questionnaires,
Dr. Derleth chose these questions be-
cause they accurately reflect the key
pieces of information that help identify
instability in an area from the local perception.
The Analysis phase centers on gaining situational awareness of the u
sector through four “lenses.” The first lens is PMESSI (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information), which is a methodology
used to understand the operational
background. The second lens is the cultural environment (tribe, clan, religion, language). The third lens is other factors, such as grievances, resiliencies, events, and key actors. The
final lens is local perception which is information
gathered through the TCAPF questionnaire during the collection phase.
The Design phase focuses on identifying activities that can actually solve the grievance. After
the proper activities have been identified, they will
be implemented and their performance and effects
will be monitored and evaluated. This was a very
simplified version of what a five-day course. However, there are less than six people in the world
that can really teach TCAPF. Plans must be made
with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to not only teach TCAPF but also stability
operations in all levels of officer courses (from officer basic course to the Army Command and General Staff College's Intermediate-Level Education
program) and non-commissioned officer education
systems, from Warrior Leader’s Course to the First
Sergeants Course). This task shouldn’t fall solely on
the shoulders of the COIN Academy in Camp Ju-
lien, which started its inaugural Stability Course in
early November. Ironically, TFS was invited to
send a guest instructor to academy to help teach
the very people who were going to advise and assist
all Task Forces on stability operations- the Counterinsurgency Assist and Advise Teams.
The reason why TFS was the only brigade
who had a qualified instructor to send was because
of its decentralized networks. TCAPF was identified by the Marines during the previously mentioned lessons learned session as something useful
and TFS contracted out for the training in early September. By the time this tool has reached the ears of higher civilian and military
leadership, TFS has become one of
the leading proponents and users
of it.
Over the last one hundred
days, TFS has built a network and
a reputation that has taken a life
of its own. The decentralized fusion cells branch out to combined,
joint, and interagency partners. As
the fusion cells’ network expands
and the whole picture comes into
view, they stand in a great position to achieve the desired end state.
Centralize Their Network
Revolutionizing TFS’s own
network is only half of the solution. A
careful balance of decentralization
has worked well so far in a centralized organization. The next step would be to centralize the district level government. The Governance, Reconstruction, and Development fusion cell’s end state
is to “build administrative and judicial infrastructure that will deliver security and stability to the
population.”
121 Enable the government to provide a
set of services that the population will come to de-
pend on. The first step to accomplishing this is to
establish or improve the district centers. District
level officials, along with the ANSF, are the only
level of government that the average Afghan sees
day to day. Therefore, there needs to be district
level officials present in the district centers every-
day. Having a great district governor means nothing if his life is in jeopardy. The ANSF’s barracks
must be placed alongside the district center to include Coalition Forces and mentoring units.
The district center must radiate security and
stability to the immediate surrounding population
and then to the next largest population center. If
there are no district officials then a civil-military
push must be made to Kabul to ensure proper
staffing. If the district officials aren’t qualified then
proper training must be provided whether it is in
Afghanistan or if it’s at the prestigious Civil Services Academy of Pakistan in Lahore.
While deserving district officials are out
training, Kabul should send down temporary officials, mimicking what the Focused District Development plan of the Ministry of the Interior does.
That program brings Afghan National Police to a
training academy in order to enhance their capabilities and build the rule of law. Concurrently, the
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
comes down to the area where the Afghan National
Police just left and serves as the police force while
the Afghan National Police are in class. There
needs to be the civilian equivalent of “ANCOPs” for district officials while they are out training.
Accomplishing this task requires networks
of partners in various capacities and position.
TFS’s fusion cells continue to grow and learn from
their experiences in southern Afghanistan. FM 3-
24,
Counterinsurgency, states, “in COIN, the side
that learns faster and adapts more rapidly-the better learning organization-usually wins” and “promoting learning is a key responsibility of commanders at all levels.”
The coup de grace is to execute a brigade-wide collaboration session from the team leader
above. In TFS, every combat soldier is networked
through Land Warrior. Combined, joint, and interagency networks are wired through its decentralized fusion cells. The final step is to connect the
combat soldier to the multi-disciplinary field of
experts and policy makers in order to have collaboration with partners at every level of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.
The Tribal Network
There is a saying in the Canadian Army: “We
are tribal.” This saying stems from the size of the
Canadian Army, approximately 35,000 strong,
which makes it easier to network because of its intimate nature. Perhaps that is why Major Claude
Villeneuve, a former Civil-Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) company commander of the Kandahar
Provincial Reconstruction Team, wanted to introduce his relationships with Afghans instead of talking about specific projects. In a tribal society with
undeveloped governance, the power of networks
has been clearly illustrated. That is why the Canadian Army finds it much easier to translate this experience to its dealing with the Afghans.
The Chinese have a saying too, “You keep
the land and lose the people, you lose both. You
keep the people and lose the land, you have both.”
FM 3-24,
Counterinsurgency, states, “political
power is the central issue in insurgencies and
counterinsurgencies.” Conceivably, it is time to
rethink the term “battle-space owner.” The military
looks at its area of operation as chunks of land with
distinct borders. It is time to start looking at population centers and fully appreciate the political nature of the conflict. The Russians owned the land
much like Coalition Forces do today. But did they keep the people?
The power of information is so fast and pervasive that it is impossible to control it. Networks
come in many forms and it is up to military leaders
to find the right balance. There is a clear need for
decentralized networks working side by side centralized networks. Decentralized networks create
innovation necessary to defeat the enemy. Civil-military networks help tactical commanders in understanding the whole picture and therefore lead to
better decision making. After all, “to defeat a network, you have to be a network.”
Notes114. Gilbert, Michael. “Stryker brigade readies for war” The News Tribune May 5, 2007 http://www.thenewstribune.com/356/story/55324.html
115. Moore, Karl. “Talking Management: Leadership message
from a four-star general” The Globe and Mail Aug 14, 2009
http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/08/14/26059-talking-
management-leadership-message-from-a-four-star-general/
116. Dawson, Debi. “Army to Equip Brigade with 'Land Warrior” Army News Service May 28, 2008 http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/05/28/9450-army-to-equip-brigade-with-land-warrior/
117. Brafman, Ori and Rod A. Beckstrom. The Starfish and the Spider, New York: Penguin, 2006.
118. Clegg, Neil. Private Conversation. Kandahar Airfield, November 12, 2009.
119. Kandahar Action Plan, August 21, 2009: 1
120. Upper Quartile, “RC(S) Agriculture Development Review” July 2009: 10
121. Ahmed, Akbar. “American has yet to grasp the cost of losing in Afghanistan.” Guardian 5 October 2009.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/Oct/o5/afghanistan-us-strategy-mcchrystal-troops